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There is no more obnoxious specimen of migratory water-
fowl than the canard that judges and lawyers don't care about
truth. Despite the unlimbering of professional shotguns behind
thousands of duck blinds, the bird flies on, flapping its wings
about our heads and occasionally besmirching us with its
ordure. It is borne aloft not by its meager wingpower, but
upon the thermal currents of air arising from the fields we
have plowed so as to turn under truth in the hope of raising
something better. The plowing under of truth is necessary, or
at least defensible, when done in the interest of harvesting
some worthy privilege.1 But when done in the interests of the
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1. The test of an evidentiary privilege is ultimately its prevalence in the face of
insistent demands for truth. For example, the privilege of a criminal accused to
exclude evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, recognized in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), has always been
controversial and remains under attack. See Adams & Nock, Search, Seizure, and
Section 7: Standing from Salvucci to Simpson, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1 (1982).
With respect to the cognate privilege arising under the Washington Constitution, see
Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 331 (1984); Note, The Original Development of Washington's
Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled
Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459 (1986). Relatively new privileges, such as that of a
journalist not to reveal his source, often bow to an overriding public interest in the
ascertainment of truth. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert denied, 439
U.S. 997 (1978). Even such a firmly established privilege as that for attorney-client
confidential communiciations has on occasion suffered the same fate. See Dike v. Dike,
75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968). On the whole, privileges prevail only to the extent
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profession, it is not merely indefensible, it is futile. Truth, in
such cases, will not merely regrow; it will penetrate asphalt,
macadam, or even concrete in its relentless effort to reach the
light.
That "truth will out" stems not from any quality mysti-
cally inhering in truth itself. Rather, in a legal context, it
stems from the simple fact that judges and lawyers really do
care about truth. In fact, we are enraptured by and endlessly
fascinated with truth. As the best-known Barrett of Wirnpole
Street might have put it, we love truth with the passions put to
use on our lost saints, and with our childhood's faith.2 But the
truth for which our actions show our love is truth incarnate;
we work endlessly, tirelessly, and passionately to bring to light
truth in any particular case. Our love for truth as an abstrac-
tion is manifest, if at all, only in hollow declarations.
It is our differential devotion to truth in the abstract and
in the concrete that goes to the heart of the problem dealt with
here. We pay lingual homage to truth as an abstraction, while
consenting to its subordination to other values, some of them
base. But the subordinating institutions fall ultimately in the
path of our passionate and relentless pursuit of truth in spe-
cific cases.
These maunderings are prompted by reflection upon a
venerable, though spare, line of Washington decisions demon-
strating the vulnerability of restrictive hearsay rules to the
onslaught of truth. This Article will focus on two decisions of
the Washington Supreme Court illustrating the unfortunate
expansion of certain hearsay exceptions in order to accommo-
date truth, show that the expansion could have been avoided
had Washington adopted a "general" exception comparable to
that found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and propose the
adoption of an exception shorn of the defects of the rejected
federal version.
The Washington Supreme Court, on the recommendation
that they reflect a broad consensus that they protect values even more important than
the accurate determination of litigation. Interestingly, though there is a consensus that
these values are more important than truth, there is no consensus on precisely what
these values are. The traditional approach is that privileges foster relationships. See 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § § 2191, 2192, 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Another view is
that they further personal autonomy through the protection of privacy. See
Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973).




of the Judicial Council Task Force on Evidence, adopted Evi-
dence Rules, effective in 1979. The Rules were drawn, and
largely adopted verbatim, from the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Federal Rules, which became effective in 1975, were
drafted by an Advisory Committee representing all branches of
the profession and appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States.3 The Committee presented the Rules to the
Supreme Court, which proposed them to Congress, which ulti-
mately adopted them4 with significant changes. One of the pur-
poses of the Rules was to have a set of clear, easily applied
rules, uniform throughout the federal court system. But the
general thrust of these rules, and one of their most attractive
features, was to expand the categories of admissible evidence
in the hope and belief that truth would thereby more easily be
found. One of the key devices employed to expand admissibil-
ity was to minimize the exclusionary effect of the hearsay rule
by narrowing the definition of hearsay' and by enlarging both
the number and scope of exceptions to the rule.' When Con-
gress had finished its surgery on the Rules, and adopted them
in their present form, they enumerated twenty-seven specific
exceptions7 to the hearsay rule and eight categories of state-
ments classified as nonhearsay despite falling within the gen-
eral definition of hearsay.' The eight categories are classifiable
for most purposes as additional exceptions. The Rules also
contained two identically worded general exceptions, often
given the faintly pejorative appellation, "catch-all" exceptions.9
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the truthfulness of
out-of-court statements, in general, cannot be properly deter-
mined by a trier of fact because of the inability to assess,
through cross-examination, the testimonial capacities (mem-
ory, perception, sincerity, clarity) of the maker of the state-
3. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE xi (1986).
4. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (1983)).
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) requires that hearsay involve an "assertion," thus
excluding certain kinds of "nonassertive conduct" which the common law excluded as
having hearsay dangers. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note; Falknor,
The "Hearsay" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
133 (1960). In addition, the Rules classify as nonhearsay a number of different kinds of
statements falling within the general definition of hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801(d).
6. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(1), (4), (6), (8), (16)-(18), (22).
7. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4).
8. FED. R. EviD. 801(d).
9. E.g., WASH. R. EviD. 803(b) comment.
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ment.10 The theory of exceptions to the hearsay rule, be they
characterized as such, or as categories of nonhearsay despite
falling within the general definition of hearsay, is that they
provide an opportunity to assess these testimonial capacities, or
deal with statements made under circumstances guaranteeing
the existence of one or more of these capacities."- Put differ-
ently, statements within the exceptions present few or none of
the impedimenta to reliability found in rank hearsay.
A lesson, laboriously learned over time, was not lost on
the architects of the Federal Rules: neither the wisdom of the
common law nor the imaginations of the best minds in the
field could foresee all possible circumstances justifying the
admission of hearsay. They thus provided for general, or
catch-all exceptions, under which hearsay of clear" reliability
could, on an ad hoc basis, be admitted despite its failure to fall
within a recognized exception.'
The general exceptions were the piece de risistance of the
Federal Rules' commitment to the discovery of truth. Though
severely attacked and the subject of great attention, they
emerged, battered and bloody, but in recognizable form, from
the legislative process.
The general exceptions did not, however, survive the pro-
cess of adapting the Federal Rules to Washington law. Even in
their weakened condition, they struck terror into the hearts of
the drafters of the Washington Evidence Rules (ER), who dis-
patched them with a terse death warrant. The reasons given
boil down to these: (1) a lack of uniformity among trial judges
in applying the exception, "which would make preparation for
trial difficult;" (2) the assumption that "even the most consci-
entious of judges" would find it "extremely difficult to follow"
the guidelines of the Federal Rules' exception; (3) the inability
of appellate courts to remove "doubt whether an affirmance of
an admission of evidence under the catch-all provision
amounted to the creation of a new exception with the force of
precedent or merely a refusal to rule that the trial court had
abused its discretion;" and (4) the fact that courts have "room
to construe an existing hearsay exception broadly in the inter-
est of ascertaining truth ....,,3
10. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
11. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note; Note, The Theoretial
Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARtv. L. REv. 1786 (1980).
12. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) advisory committee's notes.
13. WASH. R. EVID. 803(b) comment.
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The stated reasons for rejecting a general exception coun-
tenance the subordination of truth to lesser values in two
ways. First, they betoken a desire for rules capable of mechan-
istic and predictable application, which will necessarily sup-
press truth by barring probative evidence. This desire is born
of a preference for personal convenience and a conviction that
the bench, even aided by the bar, is incapable of making the
careful judgments necessary to permit the discovery of truth.
Second, they deprecate truth by encouraging the admission
into evidence of falsehood through the indiscriminate lowering
of existing barriers to admissibility.
Here begins the rise of a veritable Mesabi Range of irony
that looms over the entire problem explored in this Article.
The first irony is that the problems of unpredictability and
lack of uniformity hypothesized by the Task Force do not
appear to exist in the federal courts and other jurisdictions
adopting the general exceptions of the Federal Rules.14 More
importantly, the Task Force addressed these phantom
problems only by avoidance. The assumed difficulty in prepa-
ration for trial when attempting to predict a trial court's ruling
on admissibility could easily be solved by requiring a pretrial
determination of any issue that could be anticipated to arise
under a general exception. The problem of lack of uniformity
among trial judges could be solved, or at least ameliorated, by
the prescription of detailed criteria for determination of those
issues. Instead of addressing these points by creative modifica-
tion of the Federal Rules, the Task Force simply deleted the
general exceptions.
The second irony is that the Washington Supreme Court
adopted a report so gratuitously contemptuous of the Washing-
ton bench. The suggestion that Washington appellate courts
cannot make clear in their opinions which of their rulings have
precedential force and which do not is an imputation to those
bodies of disqualifying incompetence. The implication that the
trial bench, with the assumedly limitless adversarial assistance
of bar, is incapable of making reasoned and reasonably consis-
14. Only about ninety reported cases have arisen under FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and
804(b)(5) and their state analogs, S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 905-14, 970-78 (4th ed. 1986) and 172-74, 181-82 (Supp. 1988), and
they do not appear to have injected significant uncertainty into any body of state or
federal law. The relatively small number of cases, of course, undercuts my argument
concerning the practical need for the adoption of such exceptions in Washington.
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tent determinations on the probative value of hearsay evidence
is calumnious, if not contumacious.
The third irony is that the discretion and resultant uncer-
tainty involved in a general exception to the hearsay rule are
substantially less than those inherent in other aspects of the
Rules, notably ER 403 and 609, both of which were lifted
blithely and without concern from the corresponding Federal
Rules.
15
A final irony is the Task Force's reliance on ER 102, iden-
tical to its federal counterpart, which directs that the Rules be
construed "to secure... growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined."' 6 In justification of its deletion of
a general exception, the Task Force refers to ER 102 and states
that under it "there will be room to construe an existing hear-
say exception broadly in the interest of ascertaining truth."' 7
In other words, it is better to enlarge existing exceptions than
to provide for a general exception. The drafters of the Federal
Rules saw the matter quite differently. They justified the
existence of a general exception in the following language:
"[R]oom is left for growth and development of the law of evi-
dence in the hearsay consistently with the broad purposes
expressed in Rule 102. '' "8 The real irony here, however, is not
that Rule 102 was invoked to support the precisely opposite
positions of two groups of drafters, nor even that the Task
Force failed to acknowledge that fact. The irorny is that the
Task Force, while disdaining a general exception out of fear of
uncertainty and judicial discretion, and opting for the mechani-
cal approach seemingly offered by an exclusive list of hearsay
exceptions, had taken some pains to provide its own extensive
commentary to ER 102 (none of substance having been pro-
vided in the federal version). The commentary is worth quot-
ing at some length:
The Rules of Evidence, like other court rules, give the
15. WASH. R. Evm. 403 allows discretionary exclusion of otherwise admissible
evidence on six different grounds that involve balancing the probative value of
evidence against its tendency to waste judicial resources that distract the trier of fact.
WASH. R. EviD. 609 allows discretionary exclusion of evidence of a witness' prior
convictions to impeach him, on grounds of excessive prejudice.
16. WASH. R. EVID. 803(b) comment.
17. Id.
18. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note.
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judge authority to interpret the Rules in a way that avoids
an unjust result.
"Following the rules is not an end in itself. Rather, the
rules are carefully designed to enable judges, lawyers, liti-
gants, and juries to achieve sound results .... Rule 102 rec-
ognizes the responsibility judges bear by enumerating goals
which cannot be achieved mechanically, and which will com-
pete with one another at times....
This approach implies a considerable grant of discretion
to the trial judge in situations not explicitly covered by the
rules which may require differentiated treatment in the
light of special factors .... The rules place a burden on the
lawyer to explain his position and the reasons for it at the
trial level. It also places [sic] heavy burdens on the trial
judge.
Judges should indicate which factors are significant and
which goals paramount in a particular case and why, so that
members of the Bar can adjust to changing nuances in the
law in advising their clients and in conducting litigation.
This process of accommodation to change will itself promote
desirable change while preserving the sound fundamentals
of the law of evidence."'
19
Having thus authored a philosophical charter for a general
exception, the Task Force abandoned it with the alacrity of a
defrocked monk ridding himself of an unwanted celibacy.
But the most important irony is that the drafters' decision
not to provide a general exception has proven inimical to the
interests which the decision was taken to serve: those of the
bench, the bar, and the truth. And this result was not merely
foreseeable; it was to a large extent foreseen.2"
The pressures to advance truth in specific cases can be
contained only by the impregnable structures of privileges rec-
ognized by common consent. The lesser barriers of profes-
sional and personal convenience cannot contain these
pressures. Harmlessly or destructively, the pressures will be
released. This fact was recognized by the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary: "We feel that, without a separate residual
provision, the specifically enumerated exceptions could become
tortured beyond any reasonable circumstances which they
were intended to include (even if broadly construed)."'" As
19. WASH. R. EVID. 102 comment.
20. See supra text accompanying note 18.
21. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) Senate Committee on the Judiciary note.
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will be seen, the torture to which specific exceptions have been
put in Washington would appall even the late Padre Tomas de
Torquemada.22
The thesis of this Article, then, as reflected in the title, is
that truth will emerge, even at the price of cruel distortion of
inhibiting hearsay rules and, if necessary, with the aid of sten-
torian asseveration that the vessels of truth can pass through
the mangled portals against which they mightily strain. This
thesis will be explored in the context of two seminal decisions
of the Washington Supreme Court.23 These decisions outra-
geously expand the scope of two exceptions to the hearsay
rule, opening in the process the door to a great deal of false-
hood. The decisions can be criticized on numerous grounds
and are fundamentally unsound, but that is not the point. The
point is that the rules these cases lay down, though unjustifi-
able, are the inevitable result of the conflict between the
demands of truth and the absence of the only rationally accept-
able device to meet these demands-a safety-valve exception to
the hearsay rule. Such fundamentally wrong decisions will be
handed down because they serve fundamentally right pur-
poses. The only way to avoid the damage which they must do
to the law-and to the integrity of the fact-finding process-is
to provide a satisfactory means to get at truth. Therefore, this
Article does not criticize the decisions, but rather the con-
straints upon the judiciary which made the decisions
inevitable.
But perhaps one person's torturing is another's liberal con-
struction. The Senate committee foretold the first; the Task
Force unblushingly urged the second. Let us examine the
Washington cases and see which term better describes their
holdings.
I. STATE V. PARRIS
First in importance, though not in time, State v. Parris,24
was a drug sale case, involving the usual dreary cast of dealer,
informant, and undercover officer. DeHart was both dealer
and declarant, a felicitous alliteration that helps one keep the
22. Padre Torquemada was confessor to Queen Isabella and head of the Spanish
Inquisition.
23. These decisions, in order of their consideration in this Article, are State v.
Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982), and State v. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d 856, 651
P.2d 207 (1982).
24. 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
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dramatis personae in mind. Milliron was the informant, Hur-
ley the police officer. Milliron called Hurley and told him
that he had arranged a "buy" to take place at the Olympia
Taco Time at 10:00 p.m. Hurley and Milliron drove there and
kept the rendezvous with DeHart. DeHart said that his source
would be along shortly and that he would arrange to go with
the source to get the drugs. He was given $100.00.
Parris, the defendant, then drove up. Milliron recognized
him. DeHart got into Parris' car, took something from the
pocket where he kept money, gave it to Parris, and left,
explaining that Parris did not want DeHart in the car because
the latter's presence would make his supplier uneasy. DeHart
stated that the drugs were being obtained. The name "John"
(Parris' given name) was mentioned, but perhaps not by
DeHart. Milliron asked: "Will it be more than a half hour?"
and DeHart said that he did not think so. 25 When Milliron
asked "Well, do you think he'll return with the drugs, or the
money, and the quantity and quality would be accurate?"26
DeHart replied: "Yes. I think so. There won't be any prob-
lem."27 DeHart drove off and returned half an hour later. He
parked behind the Taco Time and brought a quantity of heroin
to Hurley and Milliron. Hurley observed the departure from a
nearby tavern of a car of the same make, model, and color as
that driven by Parris earlier.
Both the court of appeals2" and the Washington Supreme
Court upheld the admission of DeHart's statements (after
DeHart became unavailable as a witness by invoking his fifth
amendment privilege) as "statements against his penal inter-
est." The same courts further rejected Parris' claim that
admission of the statements denied him the right to confront a
witness against him, guaranteed by the federal and state
constitutions.
The hearsay exception deemed applicable is that found in
ER 804(b)(3):
(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: ...
(3) A statement which was at the time of its making so
25. Id. at 143, 654 P.2d 77, 78.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Parris, 30 Wash. App. 268, 633 P.2d 914 (1981).
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far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthi-
ness of the statement.29
This provision was adopted verbatim from the federal rule of
the same numerical designation.
Both appellate courts also took the view that the require-
ment of corroborating circumstances ought to apply where, as
in Parris, a declaration against penal interest is offered against
a criminal accused, if only to meet the demands of the Con-
frontation Clause of the sixth amendment.3'
The affirming courts found the demands of both the evi-
dence rule and the constitutional provision met. The former
were met because the statements tended to implicate the
declarant in criminal activity. The latter were met by a host of
corroborating circumstances pointing to the trustworthiness of
the statements.3 ' The formula is simple-and simply wrong.
The idea behind the hearsay exception is clear: a person
will not ordinarily make a statement against his own interests
unless it is true.32 This notion is unexceptionable, but only so
far as the person making the statement knows that it is against
his interest at the time he makes it. In sharp distinction, state-
ments of a party opponent need not be against the interest of
the maker at the time they are made--or even at the time of
29. WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI guarantees a criminal accused the right to confront the
witnesses against him. This clause has been interpreted as not requiring the exclusion
of hearsay if certain nonexclusive requirements are met. One of them is that the
hearsay must fall within a "firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule. Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Washington courts reasoned in Parris that, in order to
qualify as part of a "firmly rooted exception," a declaration against penal interest must
be accompanied by corroborating circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.
98 Wash. 2d at 148, 654 P.2d at 80-81; 30 Wash. App. at 276 n.8, 633 P.2d at 9144 n.8.
31. "[P]etitioner appeared at the Taco Time at precisely the time when DeHart
had told Milliron and Hurley that he would be meeting his 'source,' giving rise to the
all but inescapable inference that he was there by appointment; that he received some
object from DeHart, which was taken from the pocket in which DeHart had placed the
money given him for the drug purchase; and that his vehicle again was seen being
driven away from the scene at the announced time for the delivery, that being the
time when the delivery was made." Parris, 98 Wash. 2d at 152-53, 654 P.2d at 83.
32. FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
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trial. Those statements are admitted upon theories quite unre-
lated to that behind statements against interest.33
The common law traditionally recognized a hearsay excep-
tion for statements against interest only if they were against
the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest and not
merely against his "penal interest." The Supreme Court
upheld this principle in Donnelly v. United States34 by holding
inadmissible a confession by a third party to the murder for
which the defendant was on trial. In a famous and influential
dissent, Justice Holmes railed against the absurdity of allowing
a declaration that harmed the declarant's interest in property
but excluding one that rendered him liable to hang for mur-
der.35 Holmes' reasoning led to the eventual recognition of a
"penal interest" exception. The drafters of the Federal Rules
thought that any statement substantially damaging to the
interests of the maker ought to be admitted and they drafted
the exception to cover statements against the declarant's pro-
priety, pecuniary, penal, or social interests.3 6 Congress had
trouble swallowing the "social interest" aspect of the exception
but did permit statements against penal interest to join those
against proprietary and pecuniary interest on the short, exclu-
sive list of "against interest" statements covered by the
exception.37
It is clear that development of the penal interest exception
focused on the idea that a criminal defendant should be able to
introduce a statement that implicates the maker and excul-
pates the defendant.3 The question posed in Parris, and
countless other cases, is whether a statement that inculpates
both the maker and another may be offered against that other
person. Posing the question initially in this manner allows
inquiry regarding the broad question of admissibility against
any party in any kind of action, postponing for further exami-
nation the peculiar issues arising from use of such statements
against a criminal accused.
Examining only the face of ER 804(b)(3) and ignoring its
legislative history yields a simple answer. The answer depends
upon whether the statement "so far tends to subject" the
33. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
34. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
35. Id. at 278.
36. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) House Committee on the Judiciary note.
37. See id.
38. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
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declarant to "civil or criminal liability" that a reasonable per-
son in the declarant's position would not make the statement
unless he believed it to be true.
With this textual provision in mind, the Washington
Supreme Court answered the posed question with a shouted
"Yes!" and only a muted undertone of qualification. It consid-
ered that a reasonable person would be aware of the disserving
nature of any statements he makes that would have probative
value in a criminal prosecution against him and that anything
thus stated must therefore bear the hallmark of truthfulness.
Only when some clear motive to lie appears, as in the case of
someone trying to "curry favor" with authorities, would a trial
court have discretion, under ER 403, to exclude the statement
on grounds of diminished probative value.39 It makes no differ-
ence whether the statement inculpates only the declarant, or
another as well; self-condemnation provides the only needed
guarantee of trustworthiness. 4°
Of course, the court did not state the matter so baldly. It
did not purport to lay down a rule at all. But the foregoing
rule is the only one that can fairly be drawn from the opinion.
All of the factors the court identified'as necessary to invoke
the hearsay exception apply in every case where an unavaila-
ble declarant makes a statement that tends to show he is guilty
of a crime. If the same statement also tends to show that a
39. The supreme court has beaten an unacknowledged retreat from this position.
In State v. St. Pierre, 111 Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383 (1988), the court dealt with a
statement given to police by a potential defendant, in custody, as part of a plea-bargain
arrangement. The statement implicated both the declarant and the defendant in one
murder, and the defendant only in another. The court characterized it as "inherently
untrustworthy" because of the circumstances under which it was given and held that it
did not qualify as a "declaration against interest" at all. Id. at 117-18, 759 P.2d at 391.
Thus the motivation, referred to in the text accompanying this footnote, to "curry
favor" can now be used to exclude a statement altogether from the category of
declarations against interest, rather than to exclude it from evidence under the
discretionary provisions of WASH. R. EVID. 403.
40. Parris has been ably and thoroughly criticized in Beaver & McCleary,
Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest: State v. Parris Goes Too Far, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 25 (1984). The authors urge, on both constitutional and
nonconstitutional grounds, a total exclusion of statements against penal interest when
used to inculpate a third party. They base their conclusions upon both the inherent
unreliability of such statements and strong indications that the legislative history of
the Federal Rules shows that the exception was not intended to comprehend them.
This author joins in much of their criticism, but does not join in their call for a total
exclusion of such statements because such statements may carry the necessary
probative value to justify their admission and because the legislative history is
ambiguous. Nonetheless, the authors are to be commended for their valuable
contribution to the debate in which they have vigorously participated.
[Vol. 12:1
Washington Safety-Valve Exception
party to litigation is guilty of a crime, the statement may be
admitted against that party.
The aridity of the supreme court's test is demonstrated by
the test's purely objective character: the only issue is whether
a reasonable person would have been aware that the state-
ments could have evidentiary value against him in a criminal
prosecution. It does not matter whether the declarant subjec-
tively appreciated their evidentiary effect or was subjectively
aware of the possibility that they might in fact be used against
him in a criminal prosecution. As will be shown below, this
test wholly misreads the text of ER 804(b)(3) and reads out of
that exception any requirement of the presence of the factors
that actually guarantee trustworthiness.
I suggest that the starting point for applying the rule is its
text, and that the text must be read in light of the theory
behind it. The text of ER 804(b)(3) does not speak in terms of
penal interest, nor does it ask whether a reasonable person
would have been aware of the fact that his statements could
have probative value in a criminal prosecution against him.
Rather, it asks whether the statement, "at the time of its mak-
ing ... so far tended to subject ... [the declarant] to ... crimi-
nal liability.., that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."'4 1
The acknowledged theory behind the admissibility of such
statements is that a person will not ordinarily make a state-
ment against his own interests unless he believes it is true.4 2
Thus, only a statement that the declarant actually perceives to
be contrary to his interest has the necessary likelihood of
truthfulness. On the other hand, inquiry into the actual state
of mind of an absent declarant is highly speculative, and it is
sensible to impute to the declarant the characteristics of a rea-
sonable person.4 3 The rule does this, and asks, in essence,
whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of the
declarant would have been aware of the danger to his interests
in making the statement. It is vital to keep in mind that the
rule sets up an objective standard only for the purpose of
determining whether the declarant is likely to have been sub-
41. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
42. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
43. See Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application,
and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(B)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851,
862 (1981) [hereinafter Tague].
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jectively aware of some risk to his interests in making the
statement.
And that is the point forgotten by the Washington
Supreme Court and the substantial and otherwise respectable
authority on which it relied. The court thought it sufficient
that a reasonable person would have been aware of the theo-
retically legally damaging effect upon him if the statements
were somehow used against him in a criminal prosecution.
While acknowledging that "it is not the fact that the declara-
tion is against interest but the declarant's awareness of the fact
which gives the statement significance," it took refuge from
thought in the proposition that "courts have been willing to
assume that a reasonable man would be aware of the dis-
serving nature of his remarks even when they are made to a
supposed friend."44
Indeed, courts have been so willing.45 Perhaps that will-
ingness springs from a regrettable but persistent, possibly even
ineradicable, confusion: the confusion between declarations
against interest and "admissions." The latter, known in the
Federal Rules as "statements of a party opponent, '46 do not
depend for their admissibility upon the proposition that a per-
son will ordinarily not make a statement against his own inter-
est unless it is true, nor upon the connotation of "admission" in
the lay sense of the term. Rather, admissibility of such state-
ments rests upon "the adversary system" or, rather, upon the
idea that a party to litigation cannot claim that he lacks a right
to cross-examine himself to test the truthfulness of his own
statements (the party is always free to take the stand and
explain or deny his statements), or that his word is not good
unless given under oath.47 Accordingly, it is enough for exemp-
tion of such a statement from the hearsay rule that it be made
or adopted by a party and offered by an adverse party. It need
not have been against the interest of the party who made it at
the time he made it (indeed, it need not be clearly against his
interest at time of trial, though an adverse party would proba-
bly not be offering it unless it were). It may have been self-
serving when made, as by providing an alibi which later proved
44. State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 150, 654 P.2d 77, 82 (1982).
45. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 209 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d
244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976).
46. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
47. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chadbourne rev. 1972).
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false, and the giving of which is offered as an indication of con-
sciousness of guilt.4 8 Or it may have been disserving in ways
not contemplated by the maker. The classic example is found
in Escobedo v. Illinois,'9 where defendant said to his compan-
ion, in front of the police, "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did,"
thus betraying knowledge of the shooting while attempting to
shift the blame. 0 A "declaration against interest," on the
other hand, has probative value only to the extent that the
declarant knows it is in fact against his interest. A given state-
ment might be either one, depending upon whether it was
made by an unavailable declarant or by the party against
whom it is being offered. Confusion of the two is therefore not
surprising. That it is not uncommon is shown by the frequent
professional and even judicial usage of the phrase "admission
against interest,"51 a term guaranteed to produce gelaemia 52 in
any evidence teacher. But its usage is insufferable. Its exist-
ence conduces to the fundamental error that any statement
that would be admissible against the declarant when he is a
defendant in a criminal prosecution qualifies as a statement
covered by ER 804(b)(3).
The supreme court found that DeHart's statements met
the test of the "declaration against interest" exception even
though DeHart had satisfied himself that he was dealing with
genuine buyers who had the same interest in secrecy as he
did.53 Moreover, the court ignored the fact that the statements
DeHart made did not tend in any way to subject him to crimi-
nal liability beyond the actions he took in the presence of his
false friends by taking their money and giving them heroin. In
other words, he could not have appreciated the risk he
incurred when making those statements, even if he had a law-
yer's knowledge of their admissibility against him in a criminal
prosecution. Without a perception on declarant's part of actual
risk to his interests, the requisite guarantee of trustworthiness
is simply absent. And a reasonable person's perception of the
potential evidentiary significance of his statements is of no con-
48. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
49. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
50. Id. at 483.
51. E.g., State v. Young, 50 Wash. App. 107, 116, 747 P.2d 486, 491 (1987)
(Thompson, J., concurring). Even Justice White has stooped to this usage. See Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
52. Gelaemia is a Latin hybrid meaning "frozen blood."
53. State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 151, 654 P.2d 77, 83 (1982).
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sequence if a reasonable person would not perceive a risk of
actual criminal prosecution resulting from those statements.
Any analysis of the rule must ask whether a reasonable
person in declarant's position would have made the statement
in question if he did not believe it to be true. I suggest that
this highly individualized analysis can be aided by initially
placing the statement into one of three broad categories. Cate-
gory One consists of those statements which do not in fact
have any realistic tendency from the perception of the declar-
ant to damage his interests. Such statements carry no circum-
stantial guarantee of trustworthiness for any purpose. In this
category I would place statements of a declarant who knew he
was about to die, who had immunity from prosecution for his
statement or in connection with the transaction discussed, who
was domiciled in a jurisdiction from which he could not be
extradited to face trial for the crime to which he was referring,
who knew that the statute of limitations had run as to the
offense, or who had been acquitted of the offense. To this list I
would add all others who reasonably perceive no significant
risk of criminal prosecution as a result of making the state-
ments. I would include drug dealers such as DeHart, who have
assumed a tolerable risk that they are talking to police officers
or agents, but who have no reason to think their statements
will increase their exposure to criminal liability. In none of
these cases can it be said that the statement so far tends to sub-
ject the maker to criminal liability that a reasonable person in
his position would not make it if it were not true. Where no
substantial risk is or should be perceived, the truth guarantee
dependent upon that risk is absent.'
Category Two consists of statements which, however much
they may inculpate the declarants, do not reliably inculpate
third parties, such as the persons against whom they are being
offered. The most common example of a statement in this cate-
gory is that of a person who, whether or not he is in custody,
has been "caught" and knows it. His statements inculpating a
third person spring from a clear effort at blame shifting or
blame sharing. Regardless of the extent to which, if at all, the
statement inculpates the declarant, he has a strong motive to
lie about the culpability of the third person. He may think, as
did Escobedo, that he is wriggling off the hook altogether by
accusing another. He may know he is damaging himself, but
54. See Tague, supra note 43, at 943-44.
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entertain some unsophisticated hope that he may derive some
profit by implicating another. Or he may be simply protecting
his own psychological integrity by blaming someone else.
Whatever his reasoning, his motive to lie is patent. Statements
such as this have traditionally been assumed to be
inadmissible.55
Category Three is a residual category consisting of state-
ments that have such a realistic tendency to put the declarant
at risk of criminal liability that a reasonable person in his posi-
tion would not make them unless they were true, and state-
ments that are devoid of a perceptible motivation to falsely
inculpate another. The most common example is a statement
made to a cellmate. One must be terribly naive to be unaware
of the substantial risk that the person with whom he shares a
cell will scurry off to the authorities with even the slightest bit
of information that could redound to his own benefit; honor
among thieves is still no more common than gingivitis among
poultry. Casual statements to friends generally are probably of
this genre. In each case, the motive to get something off one's
chest seems to predominate over a perceived risk of damage to
the declarant's penal interests.
This category would also embrace the rather peculiar cir-
cumstances of State v. Valladares,5 the oldest child of Parris.
Declarant there had called police to her hospital room long
before she was suspected of any wrongdoing, confessed to her
drug use, expressed her fear that she would suffer dire conse-
quences from her inability to meet a debt to Valladares, her
supplier, and requested help. She cooperated in an investiga-
tion of Valladares, which amassed a great deal of evidence.
But her initial statements implicating Valladares were admit-
ted under ER 804(b)(3). 57 Although she had a strong motive to
inculpate the person she was accusing, the fact that she
brought upon herself the potential for criminal liability that
55. In Bruton v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (1968), the court dealt with a
statement by one defendant, implicating himself and a codefendant, offered in a joint
trial of both. The court assumed the inadmissibility of the confession against the
nonconfessing codefendant (against whom it had not even been offered) and held that
his constitutional rights were not protected by an instruction that the confession
should not be considered against him. Such statements have since been held
inadmissible, on constitutional grounds, against criminal defendants. See Cruz v. New
York, 109 S. Ct. 1714 (1987); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). See also State v. St.
Pierre, 111 Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383 (1988) discussed in supra note 39.
56. 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983).
57. Id. at 670, 664 P.2d at 512.
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would not have existed but for her own statements greatly
enhances the reliability of her statements and takes them out
of Category Two.
I suggest that statements in Categories One and Two be
excluded (categorically, indeed) from the scope of ER
804(b)(3). These statements simply lack sufficient reliability to
be properly deemed within this exception. Statements in Cate-
gory Three should be carefully scrutinized on an individual
basis to determine whether, under their particular circum-
stances, they really "so far tended to subject [their declarants]
to civil or criminal liability" that reasonable persons in the
positions of the declarants would not have made the state-
ments unless they were true. Only this exacting individual
scrutiny can properly assess the presence or absence of the
necessary guarantee of reliability.
The Washington Supreme Court, however, has opened the
floodgates of the exception to all three categories (though
belatedly recognizing the excludibility of some statements in
Category Two). 8 That this is wrong is demonstrable, but
somewhat beside the point. The court has sounded forth the
trumpet and this author does not expect to live long enough to
hear it call retreat. Nor, though descrying the error, can I
decry it. The real questions are why the court expanded the
exception beyond all reason, and what can be done to save
other exceptions from the same fate? And neither question is
particularly difficult.
The Parris court wrenched aside the portals of the decla-
ration against interest exception in order to admit highly relia-
ble evidence. Love of truth prevailed over all else. The
statements made by DeHart were extremely trustworthy,
though for reasons having little or nothing to do with their sta-
tus as declarations against penal interest. They were made by
someone who plainly knew what he was talking about (i.e.,
who had firsthand knowledge that was based upon a full
opportunity to observe and was not dependent upon possible
faulty memory). The declarant in Parris had a motive to tell
the truth, to advance his business enterprise, and no apparent
motive to lie59 (providing a guarantee of sincerity). Moreover,
58. See St. Pierre, 111 Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383 (1988) discussed in supra note 39.
59. The dissent in Parris postulated a motive for DeHart to lie:
"Here, DeHart, as a dealer in drugs, had a strong interest in protecting his
supplier. By acquiescing in Milliron's suggestions that Parris was his supplier,
DeHart drew suspicion away from himself and/or the real supplier. Thus, if
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to the extent that he incriminated the accused at all, the
declarant did so in such ambiguous language that no jury could
have overvalued the probative effect of his statements. Indeed,
the veracity of his statements is evident without even consider-
ing their supposed self-inculpatory character. They enjoy the
reliability commonly, though by no means always, shared by
statements of coconspirators. In point of fact, I am completely
at a loss to understand why they were not admitted as such.
Nothing in any of the opinions in the case suggests that the
coconspirator rule was ever considered. Yet DeHart's state-
ments clearly seem to be statements made "by a coconspirator
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy."'  There is ample evidence from which to infer that
DeHart and Parris were engaged in a conspiracy to sell drugs
and that DeHart's statements were made while the conspiracy
was in existence and to further its purposes. But whether the
coconspirator doctrine was unavailable to the court because
counsel had not brought it to the court's attention or for some
undisclosed reason,61 it must be deemed unavailable.
That being the case, the only way the Washington
Supreme Court could uphold the admission of DeHart's highly
reliable statements was to expand to the utmost the exception
for declarations against interest. Placing truth above technical-
ity, it did just that.
Nor are the consequences of this decision quite as bad as
they might sound. For more was required for admission of
these statements than their qualification as declarations
he was walking into a setup, the police would go after Parris as the one most
likely to have a quantity of drugs."
98 Wash. 2d at 163, 654 P.2d at 88. With enough inmagination, one can always conjure a
speculative possibility that a declarant might have some reason to lie. Absent some
clear indication of an actual motive to lie, such speculation should not be sufficient to
negate an apparent lack of motive.
60. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(v).
61. After Parris, the Washington Supreme Court developed the doctrine that use
of the coconspirator rule required substantial evidence of the conspiracy independent
of the statement sought to be introduced. State v. Dictado, 102 Wash. 2d 277, 687 P.2d
172 (1984). The Washington court reiterated this doctrine even after the United States
Supreme Court, in Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987), had reached a
contrary conclusion, interpreting language identical to that found in the Washington
Evidence Rules. The Washington court cited Bourjaily for another purpose, but did
not consider its holding on this point. St Pierre, 111 Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383 (1988).
In Parris, however, there would seem to have been ample evidence, apart from the
statement itself, of the factors bringing it within the coconspirator rule, and the court
did not suggest otherwise. The failure to consider the coconspirator rule thus remains
unexplained.
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against interest. Since these statements were hearsay being
offered against the accused, they had to meet the demands of
the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment 62 and its
state constitutional counterpart. 3 To see that those demands
were met, the court felt itself obliged to read into the law a
requirement that statements used to incriminate, like those
offered to exculpate, be supported by corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement.
To that end, the court drew upon Dutton v. Evans,6 a leading
decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the
Confrontation Clause, and United States v. Alvarez,6 the par-
ent federal case allowing the use of declarations against penal
interest to inculpate third parties, for a list of factors bearing
on reliability. Dutton focused on the classic testimonial capaci-
ties of perception, memory, sincerity, and clarity.' Alvarez
added some more specific guidelines:
(1) [W]hether there is an apparent motive to lie; (2) the
general character of the declarant; (3) whether more than
one person heard the statements; (4) whether the statements
were made spontaneously; and (5) the timing of the declara-
tion and the relationship between the declarant and the
witness.6 7
This nonexclusive list of guidelines means that, when the Con-
frontation Clause is implicated, even declarations against penal
interest must be scrutinized for individual indicia of reliability.
So it is only in civil cases that the twisting of the declara-
tion against interest exception has consequence. There is no
reason why it should not be used widely in such cases, and
when it is used widely, it will inevitably pollute the fact-find-
62. See supra note 30.
63. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
64. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). There was no majority opinion in Dutton, and references to
that case are to the plurality opinion of four justices.
65. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978). The doctrine of Alvarez is actually dictum, since
the statements involved therein did not meet the standards of the doctrine laid down
in that case. Nor was Alvarez the first case to state that declarations against penal
interest could be used to inculpate third parties. It is "parent" only in the sense of
being the most influential of such cases.
66. The plurality in Dutton found no significant possibility that the statements
therein could be founded on faulty memory or perception, disposed of the sincerity
issue by noting that the statements were spontaneous and against declarant's interest,
and dealt with the problem of clarity by pointing out that the statement was so
patently ambiguous that it carried its own warning against overvaluation. 400 U.S. at
88-89.
67. State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 146, 654 P.2d 77, 80 (1982).
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ing process with unreliable hearsay. On the other hand, no
Washington appellate civil case has used it at all. So perhaps
this Jeremiah ought to be reading Ecclesiastes.6
But if the danger to truth has thus far been shown to be
more theoretical than real, it is time to react to, rather than
ignore, the threat. We are now in this situation: the Washing-
ton Supreme Court has demonstrated that it will wreak havoc
with the procedures designed to further the search for truth in
order to see that the search succeed in a particular case. It
would be hard to find any court so bloodless as to be willing to
do otherwise. But the court has been forced into this dilemma
by the absence of a safety-valve exception to the hearsay rule.
Any reasonably designed safety valve would admit evidence of
the sort involved in Parris. If such a valve is not made avail-
able there will be an explosion, of untold potential hazard,
whenever the pressures of truth sufficiently gather. And--one
more delicious irony-the "broad construction" (an exercise in
litotes) foreseen by the Task Force 9 has indeed taken place.
But it has been accompanied by the Task Force's bete noir: the
kind of unpredictable, individualized scrutiny of hearsay state-
ments that was advanced as the reason for rejecting a safety-
valve exception in the first place.7 ° At least in criminal cases,
declarations against penal interest must now be evaluated for
reliability on an individual basis.7' Conclusion: We need a
safety-valve exception and there is no valid reason not to have
one. But this conclusion needs to be buttressed, informed, and
refined by consideration of one more case.
II. STATE V. SMITH
Smith72 involved a very different kind of statement. A
woman was assaulted in a motel room "which she kept for
work-related activities."73 She went from the hospital to a
police station, where she wrote out a statement in her own
words, and swore to it before a notary, identifying defendant as
her assailant. Later that day, defendant chased the victim,
took her car keys by force, and left. At trial, the victim
described the assault, but identified one Gomez as the assail-
68. See, e.g., Ecclesiastes 1:2 (Authorized Version).
69. WASH. R. EVID. 803(b) comment.
70. Id.
71. See State v. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (1982).
72. 97 Wash. 2d 856, 651 P.2d 207.
73. Id. at 858, 651 P.2d at 208.
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ant. She admitted giving the sworn, voluntary statement, but
testified that she was upset with defendant at the time. She
also testified that she had lived with defendant both before and
after the assault and had left $150.00 for him at the jail for cig-
arettes. She denied he was her pimp.74 Surprised, the prosecu-
tor successfully moved for the admission of the prior sworn
statement in evidence. It turned out to be the only evidence,
given at trial identifying defendant as the assailant. The
Supreme Court of Washington upheld the admissibility of the
statement, reversing the trial court's grant of a new trial.
The statement had been admitted pursuant to ER
801(d)(1)(i), which provides:
A statement is not hearsay if-The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement, and the statement is... inconsistent
with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition .... 75
The court actually accepted certification of an issue from the
court of appeals, the issue being whether this provision "per-
mits the admission of a trial witness' prior inconsistent state-
ment, as substantive evidence, when that statement was made
as a written complaint (under oath subject to penalty of per-
jury) to investigating police officers." 76 Having accepted certi-
fication of the issue, the court ostensibly refused to decide it.
Instead, it held that the statement was admissible under the
facts of the particular case.77
The issue was whether the term "other proceeding" could
encompass a police investigation. The court's approach to
resolving this issue was to examine the reliability of the state-
ment. In fact, the opinion contained a generalization that, for
all its breathtaking inaccuracy, expressed a deep judicial yearn-
ing: "In determining whether evidence should be admitted,
reliability is the key.'""8 That particular key was found in the
facts that the victim "voluntarily wrote the statement herself,
swore to it under oath with penalty of perjury before a notary,
74. Id. at 859, 651 P.2d at 209.
75. WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
76. 97 Wash. 2d at 857, 651 P.2d at 208.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 861, 651 P.2d at 210. If the statement were literally true, the rules of
evidence could be reduced to a few sentences, an enormous body of constitutional law
would disappear, and evidence teachers would have to find honest work.
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admitted at trial she had made the statement[,] and gave an
inconsistent statement at trial where she was subject to cross-
examination."79 The court further noted that the police inves-
tigation was undertaken in order to assist the prosecutor in
determining whether to file an information. The filing of an
information was identified as one of four methods for deter-
mining the existence of probable cause, thus allowing the filing
of charges. The other methods were grand jury indictment,
inquest proceedings, and filing of a criminal complaint before a
magistrate.80 The court reasoned that since the latter three
methods all involve "other proceedings," as that term is used
in ER 801 (d)(1)(i), so must a police investigation."'
The result in the case is fine, even compelled. Unfortu-
nately, it cannot be reached without severe distortion of
existing law. I will briefly point out the distortion that the
court employed, and suggest how it might have found a more
sophisticated distortion. The point, however, is the same made
in connection with Parris: distortion on the grand scale will
inevitably become ordered to accommodate the demands of
truth.
Examination of the opinion requires some background on
ER 801(d)(1)(i). Ostensibly, the section is not a hearsay excep-
tion. Rather, it classifies as nonhearsay those statements it
describes. It does so notwithstanding the fact that such state-
ments clearly fit within the general definition of hearsay found
in ER 801(a)-(c). The classification of such statements as
nonhearsay, rather than as exceptions to the hearsay rule,
seems arbitrary, but is actually the proud assertion of a muti-
lated and bloodied notion: that a statement ought not be con-
sidered hearsay when its maker can be examined in court
concerning its truthfulness. The idea behind this notion is that
such in-court examination provides an adequate basis for
assessing the truthfulness of the statement. The Federal and
Washington Rules, as presently written, identify two general
classes of such statements. The second such class, found in ER
801(d)(2) and its federal counterpart, consists of five different
categories of statements by a party opponent. The idea is that,
as previously noted, a party can always take the stand and
explain or deny his prior statement, allowing the trier of fact
79. Id. at 863, 651 P.2d at 211.
80. Id. at 862, 651 P.2d at 210-11.
81. Id.
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to assess his credibility as a witness and thus the truthfulness
of the prior statement. Unfortunately, this idea is pure fiction
when it is applied to statements other than those that the
party has made, adopted, or authorized, such as statements of
an agent unauthorized to speak, or of a coconspirator.8 2
The second category of constructive nonhearsay consists of
certain prior statements of a witness. Thereby hangs a tale.
The Advisory Committee, the United States Supreme Court,
and the Senate, all adopted the view that prior statements of a
witness should not be excluded on hearsay grounds. This view
is based upon the idea that there are no hearsay dangers in the
reception of a witness' prior statements. If the statements are
consistent with the witness' testimony, and the witness affirms
them, they become part of his testimony. If they are inconsis-
tent, the trier of fact can discern from cross-examination of the
witness (and other guides to the assessment of credibility)
whether his testimony is truthful and thus whether his prior
statement is accurate."3 The doctrine has compelling logic and
impeccable credentials.' It has been adopted by ten American
jurisdictions,85 most notably California"6 and most recently
Pennsylvania.87 Even before recommending it as a rule of evi-
dence, the Supreme Court held that it satisfied the demands of
the Confrontation Clause.88 And it has been vigorously
opposed, often by those with considerable trial experience who
are skeptical of the effectiveness of cross-examination concern-
ing statements not made or adopted on the witness stand.89
This author takes no position in this debate. But the oppo-
nents of this view prevailed in the House of Representatives
and forced the political compromise that produced the enacted
82. See WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(iv), (v).
83. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note.
84. The doctrine received the judicial endorsement of Judge Learned Hand in Di
Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925), and the professorial endorsement of
commentators such as Edmund M. Morgan, in Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
85. Arizona, California, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin. The authorities are collected in Commonwealth v.
Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66, 70 (1986).
86. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
87. See Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66, 70 (1986).
88. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
89. See, e.g., Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v.
Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
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language. 90 Under that language, the prior inconsistent state-
ment of a witness is admissible as substantive evidence only if
it is given under oath subject to penalty of perjury at a "trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition." The legisla-
tive history makes clear that the term "other proceeding" is
intended to cover grand jury proceedings. The only other clue
to what else it might cover is a passing reference to a "formal
proceeding."9 1 (The remainder of ER 801(d)(1) and its federal
counterpart, incidentally, classify as nonhearsay certain prior
consistent statements and prior identifications.)9 2
The rule in its present form is thus the product of two
competing theories: the idea that hearsay dangers do not exist
when the prior statements of a witness are used, even as sub-
stantive evidence, and the notion that hearsay dangers can be
overcome by circumstances imparting reliability to a hearsay
declaration. The hybrid (or perhaps faunlike) nature of the
rule produces mischief in attempting to construe the sadly
vague term "other proceeding." Congress thought, wisely or
otherwise, that an opportunity to cross-examine a witness
about her own prior inconsistent statement was insufficient to
justify removing it from the exclusionary ban of the hearsay
rule. More was required, in the form of a guarantee of reliabil-
ity. The best statement of what it takes to provide that guar-
antee was made in a comment quoted by the Smith court itself:
Inquiry into what other statements are encompassed by
the Rule should be informed by the two purposes Congress
had in mind in narrowing the provision originally proposed
by the Court. The first was to remove doubt as to the mak-
ing of the prior statement .... The second purpose was to
provide at least the minimal guarantees of truthfulness
which an oath and the circumstance of a formalized proceed-
ing tend to assure.
93
It follows that the definition of "other proceeding" ought to be
90. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary
notes, conference committee notes.
91. United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1971), cited in FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) House Committee on the Judiciary notes.
92. Prior consistent statements are admissible under largely the same conditions
as at common law, but as substantive evidence, and not merely for rehabilitation
purposes. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). A witness' prior statement identifying a person
after perceiving him is classified as non-hearsay under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
93. State v. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d 856, 861-62, 651 P.2d 207, 210 (1982) (quoting 4 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 419 (1980) [hereinafter LOUISELL &
MUELLER]).
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informed by a consideration of the extent to which the pro-
ceeding tends to guarantee truthfulness, such as by impressing
the declarant that she is making statements of consequence. A
"formalized proceeding" tends to have this effect. The proper
question for the Smith court was whether, or when, a police
investigation does so.
But the court did not address that issue, despite the preci-
sion of the question of which it had accepted certification.
4
Instead, it embarked upon a search for factors, quite unrelated
to the question of whether a police investigation is a "proceed-
ing" designed to give credibility to the witness' prior sworn
statement under the totality of the circumstances attendant
upon its making.95 The court found these factors in the wit-
ness' having voluntarily written the statement in her own
words, sworn "before a notary" and admitted at trial that she
had made the statement.96 The court's only direct inquiry into
the question of whether a police investigation could be a "pro-
ceeding" consisted of its likening the investigation to other
enterprises, clearly "proceedings" the purpose of which is to
determine the existence of probable cause for the filing of
criminal charges.97
Some of these considerations make sense; others do not.
The "voluntary" character of the statement obviously enhances
its reliability. So does the fact that the witness wrote it out in
her own words, as opposed to signing an affidavit composed by
another, which she might not fully understand." The fact that
she admitted in court the making of the prior statement should
not be given significance, as long as there is sufficient other
evidence "to remove doubt as to the making of the . . . state-
ment." And the fact that a police investigation has a purpose
identical to that of certain "proceedings" has nothing to do
with whether the manner of its conduct is designed to impress
a declarant with its solemnity and importance, or otherwise to
contribute to reliability.
94. Id. at 857, 651 P.2d at 208. See supra text accompanying note 76.
95. Id. at 862, 651 P.2d at 210-11.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 862-63, 651 P.2d at 211.
98. "Although the meaning of 'proceeding' is not yet clear, it has been observed
that the words of limitation were designed in part to prevent the admission of
affidavits given by a coerced or misinformed witness. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)[01], 801(d)(1)(A)[01] (1975)." WASH. R. EvID. 801 comment.
99. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 93.
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In Parris, the court drastically expanded the scope of a
hearsay exception by giving it the broadest possible reading. In
Smith, the court took a rather broad rule classifying state-
ments as nonhearsay and seemed to narrow it by requiring
indicia of reliability not contemplated by the rule itself.
Although the court's approach in Smith was implosive, rather
than explosive, the result was the same: obliteration of certain
arguably sensible and legislatively-demanded barriers to the
admission of hearsay. Close analysis of the opinion shows that
the court did indeed lay down a rule, despite its stated refusal
to do so, and that the rule is a broad, if not altogether defensi-
ble one: a witness' prior statement inconsistent with her trial
testimony, voluntarily written in her own words, sworn to
under oath with penalty of perjury before a notary, taken dur-
ing a police investigation, and admitted by the witness at trial
to have been made, is not excluded by the hearsay rule.100 The
features of the kind of statement thus approved are common to
most statements taken during police investigations and can be
made common to all (except perhaps for the absurd require-
ment, which the court, it is to be hoped, would reconsider, that
the witness admit on the stand that she made the statement,
written and signed by her which is offered in evidence). Police
officers therefore know that, if they take certain steps, they
can produce a statement that will be admissible in evidence
should the witness turn coat. For that matter, the court may
have unwittingly made surplusage of everything but the giving
of an inconsistent statement under oath, subject to the penalty
of perjury, before a notary. Under the Washington perjury
statutes, perjury is committed only by knowingly giving a
materially false statement under an oath required or author-
ized by law, in an "official proceeding" or with intent to mis-
lead a public officer.'01 The latter term includes any
proceeding (a term not itself defined) before a notary.0 2 If an
oath is not authorized or required by law, then its maker is not
subject to penalty of perjury, and Rule 801(d)(1)(i) has no
application. If it is so authorized or required and is adminis-
tered by a notary, and the term "official proceeding" as defined
in the perjury statutes is deemed to be a "proceeding" for pur-
poses of the rule, then a statement made under such an oath is
100. State v. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d 856, 863, 651 P.2d 207, 211 (1982).
101. WASH. REV. CODE § § 9A.72.020, 9A72.030 (1987).
102. Id. § 9A.72.010(4).
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per se within the rule.'0 3
I do not object to this result. I could accept with equanim-
ity the broad notion that all prior inconsistent statements of a
witness ought to be admissible as substantive evidence. The
reliability-enhancing effects, however marginal, of requiring an
oath, perhaps of notarial administration, certainly appease my
meager appetite for guarantees of verity. But those who think
the language of the rule has meaning ought to be at least mod-
erately alarmed at its evisceration. And those who believe evi-
dentiary rules ought to be amended formally, rather than by
judicial construction, might wish to take at least a shadow of
umbrage at the partial eclipse of their credo.
Could the court have done otherwise and still have admit-
ted the statement? Two options, neither terribly attractive,
were available. The court might simply have decreed that a
police investigation, of whatever form or character, was a "pro-
ceeding." Such a rule would have been simple and easy to
apply, qualities prized by bench and bar alike. Given the
vagueness of the quoted term, such a construction would be
well within the bounds of judicial authority. Such a decree,
however, would have opened the doors to an infinite variety of
sworn statements, many of dubious validity, which can be quite
properly collected by police."° As a second opinion, the court
might have set forth some guidelines, or even criteria, for
determining when a police investigation is a proceeding. Such
guidelines would presumably focus on factors designed to
impress the maker of a statement with its importance and the
concomitant need for truthfulness. Such factors as the location
where the statement was made (e.g., the police station versus
the crime scene), the identity or rank of the interrogators, the
giving of warnings or other solemn abjurations, the administra-
tion of an oath before the making of the statement, or the
presence or absence of a stenographer, all might have some
103. There is, of course, no indication that the drafters of the Washington
Evidence Rules were aware of, much less acted upon, the niceties of the Washington
perjury statutes. Given their verbatim adoption of the Federal Rule, it is unlikely that
they intended to make application of the rule dependent upon those peculiar niceties.
104. Police routinely take statements from anyone having knowledge of a
particular case. They could take the trouble to have any of these statements sworn to
before a notary for any purpose, including the purpose of "locking in" a witness who
might give inconsistent testimony at trial. There is nothing inherent in a police
investigation which distinguishes it from any other activity that might involve the




bearing on whether the declarant knew or should have known
of the seriousness of her statement. The difficulty with such
guidelines, however, is that they would obscure the simple fact
that a police investigation, regardless of its inherent trappings,
is quite different from a trial, hearing, deposition, or grand
jury proceeding. All of those customarily involve structured
(and, except for grand jury proceedings, adversarial) question-
ing by officers of the court in a judicial or quasi-judicial setting
(except for a deposition, which usually has the specific safe-
guards of counsel acting as adversaries and the possibility of
judicial recourse). They are characterized by a lack of the
solicitousness for a victim or other traumatized witness that
might impede the search for truth in a police interrogation,
and are usually conducted when the witness has had the time
to calm down after the event. Thus, any characterization of a
police investigation as a "proceeding" carries the appreciable
risk, which the court may have indeed appreciated, of opening
the door to questionable hearsay. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the court sought some indicia of reliability beyond the tak-
ing of a sworn statement in the course of a police investigation.
The fact that it ended up expanding the rule to embrace the
product of cleverly conducted police investigations is merely an
unfortunate consequence of a rather sloppy approach to the
question of how to distort the rule to admit the statement in
Smith.10 5
The court was, of course, bound and determined to find a
way to admit that statement, as indeed it should have been.
The statement so reeks of veracity that its admission is
demanded by any rational jurisprudence. Its reliability springs
from factors which the court did not expressly consider, to a
much greater extent than those which it did. The victim called
the police to the hospital, bearing the fresh marks of a severe
assault."° She unequivocally identified her assailant as some-
one she knew very well. In short, there was no possibility that
her statement was the product of faulty memory or perception,
or ambiguous on the issues of assault or the identity of the
assailant. The only question concerned its sincerity. On this
question, the trial court had much more than the statement
itself. Defendant had offered violence to the victim on the
very day of the assault. She continued to live with him after
105. See State v. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (1982).
106. Id. at 858. 651 P.2d at 208.
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the assault, indicating a motive to exculpate him. But she
waited until trial was in progress to change her story, perhaps
to bring about an acquittal, rather than a pretrial dismissal
without prejudice. His domination of her was evidenced by her
leaving him $150.00 at the jail "for cigarettes."'11 7 An all-too-
familiar pattern of abuse, complaint, repentance, and recanta-
tion was being followed. The jury had an excellent opportu-
nity to observe her under cross-examination and to resolve the
one question in dispute: was she lying on the stand, or to the
police, in her identification of her assailant? Whatever doubts
there may be generally concerning the efficacy of cross-exami-
nation in determining the truthfulness of a witness' prior
inconsistent statement, Smith was surely a case where the
truth could be counted upon to emerge.
But these factors were not considered by the court, per-
haps because they could not properly be considered. They
show the reliability of the particular statement in issue. But
the rule does not concern itself with the reliability of a particu-
lar statement. Rather, it asks only whether the circumstances,
which it posits as guaranteeing reliability in general, were
present in this case. Pretty clearly, they were not. Some tor-
turing of the rule was necessary to permit admission, a fact of
much greater importance than the court's use of the rack when
the thumbscrew might have been adequate to the occasion.
We now have two cases in which the Washington Supreme
Court found itself forced to rend irreparably the fabric of two
rules designed to admit good evidence and exclude bad. One of
these involved an exception to the hearsay rule, the other the
functional equivalent thereof. The rending was compelled by
the demands of truth and the inability of the rules to accom-
modate those demands. Other rules await similar rupture.
Rather than suppress truth, the Washington judiciary will
attack, with meat axe or scalpel, its barriers.
Most in need of rescue from potential mutilation is the
"speaking agent" rule, a favorite of the Task Force. Federal
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) treated as a statement of a party opponent
one which was made "by his agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship .... ,"108 This is a
broad and highly controversial provision. Its principal effect is
107. Id. at 859, 651 P.2d at 209.
108. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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to benefit civil plaintiffs against deep-pocket defendants by
making most statements by employees admissible against their
employers. It is subject to the criticism that such statements
are neither possessed of necessary guarantees of reliability nor
capable of being explained or denied by the party who made
them, as is the case with true statements of the parties oppo-
nent. The rule thus has enormous potential consequence for
wealth redistribution and the admission of unreliable evidence.
Recognizing this, the Task Force recommended (in light of
previous Washington law) the retention of what it called the
"speaking agent" approach'1 9 and adopted, as ER 801(d)(2)(iv),
a rule classifying as nonhearsay not all statements of an agent
of the party, but only "a statement by his agent or servant act-
ing within the scope of his authority to make the statement for
the party . . . ."110 The adoption of this drastically restrictive
rule, in preference to its federal analog, reflected a clear policy
choice by the Task Force, a choice justifiable by considerations
of both economics and the integrity of the fact-finding process.
But if a clearly reliable statement by an agent or employee is
offered against a principal, there will be considerable pressure
to find "authority to make the statement" when none, in fact,
exists.11' The adoption of lax criteria for finding such author-
ity could seriously jeopardize the policies underlying the choice
of the restrictive rule.
No hearsay exception or nonhearsay classification is
exempt from the pressures of truth. For example, the excep-
tion for a "statement describing or explaining an event or con-
dition, or immediately thereafter . . ."1 2 contains an adverb
capable of highly elastic construction. The "excited utter-
ance" 113 exception invites imaginative determinations that a
declarant was "under the stress of excitement .... 11 The
term "predecessor in interest," as used in the former testimony
109. WASH. R. EviD. 801 comment.
110. WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(iv) (emphasis added).
111. There is some indication that this pressure has had its effect. In Lockwood v.
A C & S, Inc., 109 Wash. 2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987), the Washington Supreme Court
dealt with some highly reliable business records, and was quick to assume that the
person keeping them had been authorized to speak through the records. The result
may have been the fault of counsel for failing to make a proper record, but is
nonetheless admonitory.
112. WASH. R. EVID. 803(1) (emphasis added).
113. WASH. R. EvID. 803(2).
114. Id.
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exception, 115 appears sufficiently mystifying as to admit all
sorts of constructions" 6 and is thus highly susceptible to an
interpretation that would open the door in civil cases to the
use of wide varieties of former testimony against persons hav-
ing no realistic opportunity to cross-examine the declarants. 1 7
If there is hope for an end to the torture, it lies in the cre-
ation of a safety-valve exception to the hearsay rule. Such an
exception, properly drawn, would accommodate both the need
for truth and the integrity of existing rules removing certain
kinds of hearsay from the exclusionary ban, and thus remove
the pressures to violate that integrity. It may not work.
Indeed, it is clear that the existence of a general exception, by
itself, will not prevent such violation, since the perversion of
the declaration against interest exception had its inception and
full development in the federal courts,"" where such a general
exception exists. 1 9 The success of the safety valve would
depend upon its inherent efficacy and the willingness and abil-
ity of bench and bar to use it effectively.
With those factors in mind, this Article will next address
the problem of formulating a promising safety-valve exception
to the Washington hearsay rule, in light of both the demon-
strated need for such an exception and the legitimate criti-
cisms that have been directed at the residual exception, which
the Task Force refused to adopt.
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE EVIDENCE RULES
The Task Force, in deciding "not to adopt any catchall pro-
115. WAsH. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
116. Compare In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 72 F.R.D. 108 (D. Conn.), aff'd
per cur/am, 551 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976) with In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices
Antitrust Litig., 444 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
117. The exception applies, by its terms, "if the party against whom the testimony
[of an unavailable declarant] is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." WASH. . EVID. 804(b)(1). The
mere opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the earlier proceeding, by somebody,
is not enough. The party against whom the testimony is offered must have had his
own opportunity to develop the testimony, unless that opportunity was enjoyed by a
"predecessor in interest" of the party. Obviously, liberal construction of the term
"predecessor in interest" could effectively wipe away the requirement that the party
against whom the testimony is offered must have had, in the ordinary case, the
opportunity to develop the testimony.
118. See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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vision, ' 120 seemed to think that the choice was between the
federal provision or none at all and found the former distaste-
ful in certain particulars. The federal provision referred to a
"statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness .... ,121 The Task Force's characterization of
this standard as "elastic" is not unreasonable, particularly
given the diversity of the circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness offered by the various exceptions and the difficulty
of determining equivalence thereto. But the problem of elas-
ticity can be substantially remedied by setting forth a nonex-
clusive list of factors that the trial court should consider in
assessing the reliability of any statement and the propriety of
its use. There is fortunately at hand an initial list of factors
bearing upon reliability. The Parris court, drawing upon Dut-
ton v. Evans' 2 and United States v. Alvarez,' 3 has, as noted
above, identified a number of relevant factors. 24 The Dutton
criteria deal with specific guarantees of the testimonial capaci-
ties of perception, memory, sincerity, and clarity.' The Alva-
rez factors relate specifically to sincerity and to the question of
whether the statement was made at all. 2 6 For purposes of
Confrontation Clause analysis, these criteria are now clearly a
part of Washington law. They can therefore usefully be made
part of the list of reliability criteria. To these may be added
such criteria as whether the declarant had a motive to tell the
truth (which is not the same as not having a motive to lie),
whether the declarant made inconsistent statements, and the
presence or absence of corroborating circumstances.' 7
The appropriateness of using a given statement should be
determined by considering its reliability in conjunction with
the need for its use. The Federal Rule requires that the state-
ment be "more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts .... ,128 As an absolute require-
120. WASH. R. EvID. 803(b) comment.
121. FED. R EVw. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
122. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
123. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 67.
125. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74. See supra note 66.
126. See supra text accompanying note 67.
127. The presence of corroborating circumstances is, of course, an express
requirement for certain applications of FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
128. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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ment, this seems to impose an unnecessary bar. Other provi-
sions can discourage casual use of a safety-valve exception.
Nonetheless, the court should be able to consider the impor-
tance of the statement to the proponent's case. Similarly, it
should consider whether the declarant is available. The idea of
the "unavailability" exceptions is that they embrace state-
ments, the probative value of which is inferior to that of live
testimony, but sufficiently great to justify admission when the
declarant's testimony cannot be had." Similarly, the needs of
justice may require the admission of a given statement when
its maker is not available as a witness, but not if its maker can
testify.
The drafters also expressed concern that trial preparation
would be made difficult by the uncertainty concerning the
admissibility of a given statement engendered by the elasticity
of the admissibility standard of the federal catchall excep-
tion.130 There are ways to ameliorate, and perhaps eliminate
altogether, this difficulty. The most obvious device is to
require pretrial determination, wherever feasible, of admissi-
bility issues arising under a safety-valve exception. 131 Such a
provision would not, of course, solve the problem of the lawyer
who wants to know the admissibility of certain evidence before
deciding whether to prosecute or defend a claim. But lawyers
can never predict admissibility decisions with certainty, partic-
ularly before the filing of a complaint or answer. The list of
criteria mentioned earlier would remove considerable elasticity
from the standard and permit a lawyer to make a highly
informed prediction concerning admissibility, even before
determination.
The requirement of a pretrial determination, with the bur-
den on the proponent to arrange for a hearing, would also tend
to ensure that the safety-valve exception would not be used
lightly or frequently. A requirement that the trial court state
for the record the reasons behind its admissibility decision 132
would also serve this end (presumably because counsel would
be reluctant to impose upon the court) and, more importantly,
129. 4 S. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 804-35 (1985).
130. WASH. R. EVID. 803(b) comment.
131. Such a provision for mandatory pretrial determinations of admissibility would
not be new. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020 (1987), providing for such a hearing in
certain sexual-offense cases.
132. Such a requirement has been judicially imposed in other contexts. See State
v. Alexis, 95 Wash. 2d 15, 621 P.2d 1269 (1980).
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would ensure some degree of attention to criteria pertinent to
admissibility, with a consequent reduction of elasticity in the
admissibility standard. The pretrial determination should be as
informed as possible. Hence, the rule would require the propo-
nent, in the language of the federal provision, to make "known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the .. .hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particu-
lars of it, including the name and address [if known] of the
declarant."' 33 The phrase "if known" has been inserted to
avoid the implication of the Federal Rule that the death or dis-
appearance of the declarant would necessarily be fatal to
admissibility of his statement.
The Task Force's doubt "that an appellate court could
effectively apply corrective measures"'1 because of "doubt
whether an affirmance of an admission of evidence under the
catch-all provision amounted to the creation of a new excep-
tion with the force of precedent or merely a refusal to rule
that the trial court had abused its discretion ' 135 is, as noted
earlier, somewhat far-fetched. But if it has some legitimacy, it
could also be assuaged by a provision specifying that appellate
review of an admissibility decision under the safety-valve
exception would be limited to the issues of whether the proce-
dures mandated by that rule had been followed, and whether
the trial court abused its discretion. Presumably, even the
moderately able appellate courts envisioned by the Task Force
could follow such a simple rule.
Apart from meeting the Task Force's objection, however,
there is positive merit in making every effort to preclude the
creation of binding precedent in appellate review of decisions
made under the proposed rule. If new hearsay exceptions are
to be created, they should be adopted through the rule-making
process. Precedent-setting decisions under the rule would
unduly complicate the law. More importantly, the keystone of
my proposal is that the admissibility of any hearsay declaration
not covered by an existing exception should be determined by
assessing its reliability in light of the unique facts of each case.
There is nothing more natural for judges and lawyers than to
seek out rules as a substitute for reasoning and responsibility.
133. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
134. WASH. R. EVID. 803(b) comment.
135. Id.
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It is my aim to restrain that tendency and to compel, insofar as
possible, those who make and those who urge admissibility
decisions to focus on the search for truth, rather than the
search for precedent.
I would delete from the federal version, as vague and
redundant, the requirement that the statement be "offered as
evidence of a material fact."' 6 The red tape envisioned by my
proposal would satisfactorily guarantee that counsel would not
go to the considerable effort of attempting to remove it in
order to offer evidence of an "immaterial fact."
As to the form of the proposed rule, it would be feasible to
treat it as the last in a list of hearsay exceptions. Indeed, ER
803(b) and 804(b)(5), corresponding to the federal residual
exceptions, are already "Reserved" for "Other Exceptions."'31 7
There is only one difficulty with this approach. Under the
Federal Rules, an identically worded general exception is, for
reasons not entirely clear, found in the following two places:
at the end of the list of exceptions that apply only when the
declarant is unavailable,"s and at the end of the list of excep-
tions that apply regardless of the availability of the declar-
ant.139 In my proposal, availability of the declarant is a factor
to be considered by the trial court on the issue of admissibility.
It would engender confusion to place such a provision on either
list of exceptions, or on both. Accordingly, I recommend that
it be the subject of a separate rule. I would number it Pro-
posed Rule 808, since that is the lowest appropriate number
still unfilled. The disadvantage of this approach is that it
places a hearsay exception at some distance from the other
exceptions, and may thus be overlooked.140 That seems to be
less of a problem than the engendering of perhaps insoluble
confusion.
With the foregoing explanation, the proposed rule is as
follows:
ER 808: A FURTHER EXCEPTION
A hearsay statement not otherwise excepted from the
exclusionary effect of this title may be so excepted, in the
discretion of the court, under the following conditions:
136. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
137. These terms are the only entries under these rules.
138. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
139. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
140. Two intervening rules, having nothing to do with hearsay exceptions, would
stand between the specific exceptions and the proposed rule.
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(1) The proponent of the statement shall file a noticed
motion to determine whether the statement is to be
excepted under this rule. The motion must be timely filed
to allow a hearing thereon not less than ten days prior to the
beginning of the trial or other proceeding in which the state-
ment is to be offered. The proponent shall make known to
the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address, if known, of the declarant.
The foregoing requirements shall not apply to statements
that the proponent satisfies the court were not, and could
not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have become,
known to the proponent in time to meet those requirements,
nor as to statements, the admissibility of which depends
upon the surprise of the proponent. Where these require-
ments do apply, no order admitting a statement shall be
entered within ten days prior to the beginning of the trial or
other proceeding in which the statement is to be offered.
(2) A statement offered pursuant to this rule may not
be admitted unless the court finds that it is sufficiently relia-
ble to justify its consideration by the trier of fact on the
same basis as statements not excluded by this title. In mak-
ing this finding, the court shall consider, in light of all the
circumstances made known to it, the extent to which the
trustworthiness of the statement is guaranteed, or capable of
evaluation by the trier of fact, by the declarant's perception,
memory, and sincerity, and the clarity of the statement. All
factors germane to the determination of reliability may be
considered by the court, including, but not limited to, the
following:
(a) Whether declarant had an apparent motive to lie;
(b) Whether declarant had an apparent motive to speak
truthfully;
(c) The declarant's general character;
(d) Whether the statement was made spontaneously;
(e) The timing of the declaration;
(f) The relationship between declarant and the witness
testifying to the declaration, or between declarant and a
party;
(g) Whether declarant made other statements consis-
tent or inconsistent with the declaration; and
(h) The presence or absence of circumstances cor-
roborating the statement.
In addition, the court should consider evidence bearing on
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whether the statement was actually made or accurately
recounted, such as the number of people who heard the
statement. The court should also consider the necessity for
using the statement, in light of such factors as the availabil-
ity or unavailability of the declarant, and the importance of
the statement to the proponent's case and the interests of
justice.
(3) An order favorable to the proponent of a statement,
made pursuant to this rule, shall state, on the record, the
reasons supporting its decision, including the factors sup-
porting a finding of reliability.
(4) Appellate or other review of a decision made pursu-
ant to this rule shall be limited to the questions of whether
the procedures mandated by this rule were followed and
whether the court abused its discretion.
As proposed, the rule provides for a pretrial hearing on
the issue of whether a statement may be excepted from the
exclusionary effect of the hearsay rule. This is not precisely a
hearing on the issue of admissibility since a trial court may be
disinclined to determine admissibility until the statement is
actually offered and its relevance can be determined in light of
the totality of the circumstances and the existence of possible
other grounds for exclusion.141 In most cases, however, the
only real issue will be whether the hearsay rule requires exclu-
sion, and a determination of that issue will ordinarily be a
determination of admissibility or inadmissibility.
The burden is placed on the proponent of the statement
not only to arrange a pretrial hearing but to obtain an affirma-
tive ruling at least ten days before trial. A simple failure of
the trial court to rule on the issue will be fatal to the propo-
nent's attempt to utilize this rule (though, of course, the propo-
nent is always free to find some other way around the hearsay
rule). This guarantees ample notice to the opponent and facili-
tates his trial preparation. There is a separate requirement,
with no specific time period, for advance notice to the oppo-
nent sufficient to provide a fair opportunity to litigate the issue
of admissibility. These provisions not only protect the oppo-
nent but guarantee that the rule will not be lightly invoked.
The only exception from these requirements is for newly-dis-
covered evidence, or evidence admissible only if the proponent
is surprised. As an example of the latter, the prosecutor in
141. E.g., relevance, privilege, authenticity, and the "original document rule."
[Vol. 12:1
Washington Safety-Valve Exception
Smith was able to offer the witness' prior statement only after
the witness testified inconsistently therewith, to the prosecu-
tor's surprise.142
The requirement that an order favorable to the opponent
state for the record the reasons justifying it is absolute and is
both a further assurance that the rule will not be used casually
and an effort to provide assistance in the process of appellate
review.
The requirement of a judicial finding of reliability is obvi-
ously central to this rule. The formulation avoids the
"equivalent trustworthiness" language of the Federal Rule,
which the Task Force found objectionable, in favor of a more
generalized standard with a focus upon specific factors guaran-
teeing reliability. Both Parris and Smith purport, for some-
what different reasons,143 to demand inquiry into the reliability
of individual statements, but neither offers clear guidelines in
assessing reliability. The proposed rule provides rather clear
guidelines and should enhance predictability and uniformity of
decision. Since the factors bearing upon reliability also go to
the evidentiary weight to be given a statement, lawyers accus-
tomed to arguing to a jury regarding the weight of evidence
should be able to render helpful assistance to the court in
determining admissibility.
Finally, the limitation of appellate review to the issues of
procedural regularity and abuse of discretion should ensure
that no precedential effect is given to an appellate court's deci-
sion on application of the rule. Each case would be limited to
its own peculiar facts, and there would be no risk of the
improper creation of a new exception. It would be theoreti-
cally possible to find abuse of discretion in excluding evidence
under this rule, but the thrust of the prescribed procedures is,
except in highly unusual cases, to provide review only for
orders admitting such evidence.
How would our principal cases have been decided under
the proposed rule? In Parris,'4 a finding of reliability would
clearly have been sustained. As noted earlier, there were no
142. State v. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d 856, 859, 651 P.2d 207, 209 (1982).
143. In Parris, the reliability inquiry was in response to the demands of the
Confrontation Clause. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d at 145, 654 P.2d at 79. See supra note 30. In
Smith there was no Confrontation Clause problem. See California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970). However, the court required specific guarantees of reliability without fully
stating why. Smith, 97 Wash. 2d at 860, 631 P.2d at 209.
144. 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
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problems of memory or perception; no apparent motive to lie; a
motive to speak truthfully (to further the drug sale operation
in which declarant was engaged); no latent ambiguity; no like-
lihood of unclarity leading to potential overvaluation of the
statement; making of the declaration during, rather than after,
the operation to which it referred; and a host of corroborating
circumstances. The fact that two persons heard the statements
increases the likelihood of accurate recountal. The necessity or
importance of the statements, however, is far from clear. The
prosecutor seems -to have had quite a strong case without them,
and they may have contributed little to the conviction. The
prosecutor may have been disinclined to go to the trouble of
following the procedural demands of the rule, and if he had
done so, the court might not have been satisfied with the
importance of the evidence. An exclusion under such circum-
stances could hardly have harmed the ends of justice. And
admission would not have required the drastic expansion of
the exception for declarations against interest which has
afflicted us ever since.
In Smith,'45 by contrast, the evidence in question was vir-
tually the whole case against the defendant, and its importance
was thus clear. No one doubted that the statement was actu-
ally made. As noted, it was unambiguous and not subject to
the possibility of faulty memory or perception. And its sincer-
ity was obviously guaranteed. Its admission would be virtually
mandated under the rule. The absence of a pretrial hearing or
order would be no bar because the statement did not become




The problem addressed in this Article is a manifestation of
the best and the worst in the judicial system. What is best
about the system is that those who operate it love truth. What
is worst is that the system far too often compels a choice
145. 97 Wash. 2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (1982).
146. It would be pointless for a prosecutor, under the proposed rule, to move for
an order excepting a sworn statement of a prospective witness from the hearsay rule,
absent some indication that the witness would testify inconsistently at trial. In nearly
every case, of course, the witness will testify in accordance with his prior statement. If
the prosecutor is legitimately surprised by inconsistent testimony, then a predicate for
admissibility is established by the inconsistency and lack of a pretrial motion is
excused by the surprise.
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between truth and law, a variant of the much too familiar
choice between law and justice. The problem is a reminder
that "every mature system of justice must cope with the ten-
sion between rule and discretion"' 47 and that we fall short in
maturity as we imperfectly thus cope. Our readiness to choose
discretion or rule, truth or law, obscures the fact that we can
often have both.
The demand for truth in specific cases will burst all barri-
ers. When the barriers are rules of evidence that keep a little
truth and a lot of falsehood from polluting the judicial system,
their destruction poses serious threats to the overall pursuit of
truth. I have proposed a procedural device designed to protect
the integrity of the hearsay rule against the assaults of evi-
dence of such truthful character that it will be admitted, at
whatever cost, to the rule itself. Adoption of this device, in
some form, may have some immediate practical benefit. But it
would, at all events, symbolically reaffirm our commitment to
the rule of law, or at least the law of rules.
147. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J.,
dissenting).
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